08/11/09

Marche Russe / Русский Марш 2009



Comme l'année dernière, quelques photos du 04 novembre à Moscou et des défilés qui ont eu lieu ce 4 novembre, jour de l'unité nationale ...



Les NASHI ont réuni plus de 10.000 personnes sous le slogan : "la Russie pour tous" ...






Les ultra-nationalistes du DPNI ont eu fait défiler près de 7.000 militants (contre moins de 2.000 l'année dernière) dans le sud est de la capitale ...




OBRAZ a organisé un concert de chants patriotiques en plein centre ville devant près de 3.000 personnes (soit le double de l'année dernière) ..





L'association Jeune Russie (branche jeune de Russie Unie le parti de Poutine) à réuni près de 500 partisans non loin de la place rouge ..





L'organisation de la jeunesse Eurasienne a réuni près de 300 militants en centre ville contre la falsification de l'histoire et sous les slogans "notre patrie l'URSS" et " Nevskii - Staline - Poutine" ..





Bien sur les grands partis politiques ont eux aussi manifestés dans le centre de la capitale ..

Le parti communiste de Russie à réuni ses troupes mais bien évidemment le 07 novembre ..




Le parti libéral démocrate était également de la partie dans le centre également ...





Enfin et bien sûr, Russie Unie à organisé un immense concert avec plusieurs milliers de ses supporters, de toutes générations ..


















Lellouche, agent de la CIA ?

Lecteur : cette vidéo à regarder, après les différentes vidéos que j'ai mis en ligne sur ce blog, celle concernant la guerre de l'Amérique contre De Gaulle, et celle de Jean Cau ...


07/11/09

La colonisation Américaine en France, par Jean CAU


04/11/09

WORKING WITH RUSSIA TO PREVENT EURASIAN COLLAPSE

The Eurasian region continues to disintegrate, and neither Russia nor the West has been able to arrest the destabilizing dynamics. Evidence of rising instability throughout the region include the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war, renewed terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus, the persistent failure of Western forces to stabilize Afghanistan, the inability of Central Asian rulers to reign in local clans and drug lords, and the paralysis of legitimately elected bodies of power in Ukraine and Moldova. 
Violence is gradually spreading, waiting for an opportunity to erupt into a large-scale conflict. 
Transregional transportation routes may soon be choked due to Russia's conflicts with Ukraine, Georgia, and Turkmenistan
The West's attempts to secure and stabilize Eurasia after the end of the Cold War must be recognized as a failure. In the mid-1990s, U.S. geostrategists such as Zbigniew Brzezinski recommended that the United States pursue a policy of replacing Russia as the referee and protector of the newly established non-Russian states in the region. After initial hesitation, the United States and other Western states followed this advice. Yet Eurasia has not become stable or peaceful and continues to disintegrate. The bureaucrats in Washington and Brussels have failed to understand that they lack the resources, the will, and the experience to stabilize the complex region. Today -- after the Iraq war and the global financial crisis -- the United States is beginning to recognize its overextension, but it is not at all clear if Washington and Brussels are prepared to act differently in Eurasia.


Russia's Absence Felt.


Russia, too, has contributed to the Eurasian meltdown. The Soviet collapse and the subsequent retreat of Russia from the region have greatly destabilized the area. By the time Vladimir Putin assumed power in 2000, Moscow's severely undermined position in the region was obvious to everyone, especially after a wave of terrorist attacks took place in Chechnya and other parts of Russia. The relative recovery of the Russian economy during the post-Yeltsin decade began to revive Russia's standing in Eurasia, yet Moscow could ill afford serious efforts to stabilize and pacify the region. At best, the Kremlin could defend its core interests abroad and begin to escape the alternative of an unstable society, dwindling population, and truncated sovereignty. By capitalizing on high oil prices, it could also advocate multilateral arrangements in the region and strengthen its presence in neighboring economies and energy companies worldwide. Preventing a collapse in Eurasia requires recognizing Russia's role in stabilizing the region. 
Once this is done in practice, and not rhetorically, many pieces of the region's puzzle may start falling into place. Energy supplies may become more reliable; governments in politically contested areas -- like Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova -- may obtain a greater legitimacy; and the so-called frozen conflicts may have a better opportunity to be resolved. Russia's recent resurgence is a response to its lacking recognition as a vital power and partner of the West. If Russia chooses to dedicate itself to obstructing Western policies in Eurasia, we will see more of the collapsing dynamics in the region. Ukraine and Moldova may disintegrate, as did Georgia. Central Asia and Azerbaijan are likely to be subjected to a much greater degree of instability with unpredictable consequences. Russia too will suffer greatly as its modernization processes will be derailed. In short, the region may change beyond recognition -- and possibly through the use of force. 


Spirit Of Cooperation


Non-Russian powers too must become involved as participants in establishing a collective-security arrangement in Eurasia. From a security perspective, it is important that the two most prominent actors in the region -- NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) -- develop a joint assessment of threat and closely coordinate their policies. Instead of expanding its reach further, NATO ought to learn its limitations. 
Without the full-fledged involvement of the SCO, Afghanistan is likely to turn into another version of Iraq, with additional negative implications for the U.S. reputation in the world. Another key issue is energy security. A new, shared understanding of energy challenges must be reached that would encourage mutual respect for each side's critical interests. 
Viewing Russia as a potentially reliable alternative to traditional Middle Eastern sources of energy may serve the West and members of the region better than the image of a "neo-imperialist" bully that only seeks to subvert its neighbors' policies. Trying to persuade European countries to invest additional billions into the Nabucco pipeline in order to bypass Russia may well turn out to be a waste of money and time. A more important and potentially unifying idea for all the parties would be to engage in the development of acceptable rules and principles of energy security among Eurasia's powers. Finally, to restore the region's capacity to function and perform basic services for its residents, it is critical to curb Russophobic nationalism. While rebuilding a Russia-centered empire would be very dangerous, there is hardly an alternative to the emergence of an economically and culturally transparent community of nations with strong ties to the former metropole. Russians and other ethnic minorities must be able freely to travel, develop their linguistic and religious traditions, and celebrate their historically significant events. The overall objective of the outside world should be to strengthen Russia's confidence as a regional great power, while discouraging it from engaging in revisionist behavior. 

Andrei Tsygankov is a professor of international relations at San Francisco State University. The views expressed in this commentary are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of RFE/RL

03/11/09

Stronger than you think !

Un article très intéressant paru hier , sous forme d'une interviw de Gleb Pavloski


By Gleb Pavlovsky



Western leaders and observers persistently repeat, like a mantra, that Russia is “weak.” This judgment is based on a flawed comparison between Russia and the Soviet Union.  Measured by Soviet standards, Russia has weakened, but as former United States National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft noted, Russia still “has enormous capacities to influence the U.S. security strategy in any country.”
A country with such influence over a military superpower cannot be considered weak. In fact, the issue is not Russia’s strength per se, but whether Russia intelligently concentrates and applies it.
The new Russia has transcended its Soviet identity and managed to put down uprisings in the post-Soviet space as far away as Tajikistan. It has dealt with a new generation of security threats on its own territory — most prominently Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev — and prevented them from turning into a global force like al-Qaida.
Moreover, Russia has helped other new nations in Eastern Europe create their own identities.
Does this not demonstrate Russia’s global know-how? Is it not a contribution to international security?
The United States has recognized the Russian factor in post-Soviet state-building processes. Russia has not been the only beneficiary of its activities in the Caucasus, especially since 2000. By bringing recalcitrant minorities into a new security consensus, Russia helped transform local ethnic conflict into a constructive process of nation building.
So Russia’s claim to being a central element in Eurasian security, on par with the United States and the European Union, is not the blustering of a spent Leviathan. Rather, it is a demand for a fair international legal order.
The debate about whether the United States should allow Russia to have “special interests” in Eastern Europe is pointless. Russia’s interests are by necessity becoming global. The agenda of U.S.-Russian relations includes issues such as treaties on the reduction of strategic weapons and on nuclear nonproliferation, NATO, Afghanistan, Iran, Central Asia, North Korea and the post-Soviet space. These are all global issues, not local ones.
Russia can be effective in dealing with these issues only if it becomes a competent global actor.  Yet many assume that world politics should be designed to bypass Russia. Everywhere Russians are expected to support something without participating in creating it. We are supposed to help stabilize the region around Afghanistan, for example, but only in order to create a “greater Central Asia” that will not include Russia.
It is clear that modern Russia lacks a “global status” in the Soviet sense. But the United States has also been unable to achieve the global status of a “Yalta superstate.” The U.S. global military power is undisputed, although it is used with decreasing frequency.
Sprawled over 11 time zones — five of which border China — it is impossible to expect Russia to remain merely a regional power.
A state that is involved in four global regions — Europe, Central Asia, the Far East and the Arctic — and borders several others cannot be considered “regional.”
Moreover, because the regions in which Russia has interests face a number of problems, it must seek influence over the strategies for those regions pursued by other powers of various sizes, from China and the United States, to the EU and Iran. Russia is expected to act in ways that are beneficial to U.S. and Western interests. But it is in Washington’s interest to enhance Moscow’s capacity to act and to strengthen a globally competent Russia. This would be a Russia that acts in pursuit of its own interests — the same way that the United States and the EU act.
Americans sometimes suggest that Russia has a hidden strategic agenda. But the consensus that Vladimir Putin has created in Russia since he became president in 2000 is more than a question of interests. It is a value-based reality. It is based on the possibility of a free life in a secure environment — something that Americans take for granted.
For many years, we had to deal with the problem of Russia’s very existence rather than that of the quality of its governance.
Putin’s consensus made it possible to resolve both problems without foreign assistance and interference.
Now in order to solve other problems, we need to go beyond Russia.

Gleb Pavlovsky is head of the Russia Institute. © Project Syndicate